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I INTRODUCTION 
There have been numerous writings and cases on all aspects of the 
insanity defence in the criminal law. A recent case is Police v 
Bannin 1 which is significant in that it attempts to place the 
insanity defence within an articulated framework of analys is 
which fits more securely into the wider definitional elements of a 
criminal charge.2 
The appellant was a 16 year old boy suffering from "Kleine-Lev in 
Syndrome", a neurological condition. This resulted in per iod ic 
episodes of prolonged sleep which were followed by several days of 
abnormal behaviour - including an impaired state of consc iousness , 
a partial memory loss and inappropriate sexual behaviour . The 
behaviour would then progressively return to normal. 
While suffering from such an episode, the accused entered the next 
door neighbour's house on several occasions. The first time he just 
stood silently behind the complainant. However five days later, he 
again entered the house, removed his t-sh irt and came up be hind 
the complainant and grasped her. The complainant strugg led free , 
and pushed the accused away telling him to stay away . Fifteen 
minutes later a th ird incident occurred where the comp lainant 
again found the accused next to her. Th is time she screamed at him 
"Get away from me. I'm telling your father ." The accused asked 
her not to and left. 
The case was an appeal against convictions for un lawfully ente ring 
a building with intent to commit a crime (section 242 Crimes Act 
1961) and assault on a female (section 194(b) Crimes Act 1961 ). 
1 [1991J 2 NZLR 237. 
2 W J Brookbanks "Criminal Law" (199 1) NZ Recent Law Review 388-389. 
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In the lower court (and later in the High Court) the issues were 
concerned solely with the accused's state of mind at the time of 
the alleged offences. The learned Judge in the District Court 
concluded that at the relevant times the accused was to a 
significant extent aware of what he was doing, and that 
accordingly the defences of sane and insane automatism were both 
excluded. 
Fisher J in the High Court proposed a framework to use when 
determining sane and insane automatism. In order to analyse the 
approach, a diagrammatic outline of the approach suggested by 
Fisher J follows: 3 
3 Above nl , 243. 
1. What are the mental elements of the crime? 
2. Assuming no mental abnormality, would the mental elements 
be a reasonable inference from the conduct? 
Y~ " No 
3. Is there independent expert Unqua 1 if i ed acquittal 
evidence of mental abnormal lty? 
vy " No 
4. Is it a disease of the mind? 
The test is whether it is an internal 
or external factor. This determines the 
onus of proof and ultimate disposition 
Conviction 
of the case . Yes / " No 
5 . Has the defence proved incapacity 
- is the accused incapable of hav mg 
m ens rea, on the balance of probabilities. 
The test is the 3 principles of awareness 
i) Some apprec i ation of the key facts . 
ii) Some capacity to make a decision to act 
with respe c t to the key facts . 
Has the prosecution dis-
proved the alleged 
incapacity beyond 
reasonable doubt? 
No 
3 
111) Some capac 1 ty to form each of the 
residual mental elements of the mens rea . 
~ o 
Unqualified 
acqu 1 tta l 
6 . Section 23 acquittal Does the accused have the m ens rea? 
The mental abnormality can be taken into 
account with a 11 the other c 1 rcums tances. 
Yes / " No 
7. If there was a disease of the m rnd, has the 
accused shown they lacked capacity to know the 
act/omission was morally wrong having regard to 
the commonly accepted standards of right and 
wrong? 
8 Section 23 acquittal 
"'o 
Conviction 
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This framework was then applied to the facts of the case. The 
findings were as follows: 
1. The mental elements for the unlawful entry charge 
included intent to unlawfully enter the house and once 
inside an intent to find and touch the complainant. And for 
the assault charge the mental elements included proving 
the sexes, and proof that the accused intentionally touched 
the complainant. 
2. Assuming no mental abnormality the mental elements 
would have been a reasonable inference to draw from the 
accused's conduct, because on the unlawful entry aspect 
the accused physically entered the house and there was 
never any suggestion of express or implied permission . 
Further, due to the close time lapse between the second 
and third incidents (only fifteen minutes), the persistence 
of the accused's conduct and the absence of an alternative 
explanation for his presence, raised a reasonable inference 
that the accused was there for the purpose of touching her. 
There was no suggestion of belief in consent, given the 
surrounding circumstances. 
On the assault charge the sexes were proved, and due to 
the resistance of the complainant when the accused 
grabbed her, it is an irresistible inference that an assau lt 
was established. 
3. Independent expert evidence was given explaining the 
Kleine-Levin syndrome and the symptoms and 
consequences .4 The evidence showed that the accused was 
suffering from altered behaviour as a result of his medica l 
condition. The important factors were : the lack of 
memory, the previous beach incident when the accused had 
laid down next to a woman , the surrounding circumstances 
of daylight, the trance like state , and the pers istent 
behaviour with no encouragement given . 
4 For a description of the evidence of mental abnormality see above n I , 246. 
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4. Fisher J found there was a disease of the mind, due to 
the fact that it was an internal factor as opposed to an 
external one. This is the test accepted by the leading 
authorities.s 
5. Incapability (which must be proved according to Fisher 
J as section 23 states that the accused must be incapable 
of understanding) was not established as on the three 
principles of awareness there was evidence of some 
awareness of the key facts. This awareness was 
establsihed by the following factors: (i) The subsequent 
recollection established awareness of the key facts , as it 
is inferred that the accused must have remembered 
something about going back to the complainants house (ii) 
Bannin made this decision to enter the house, so there was 
some capacity to make a decision to act (iii) The 
dissociation did not conclusively prove that the accused 
was necessarily incapable of advance contemplation of 
entering the house and once inside assaulting the 
complainant. Hence the insanity defence was not available 
because the disease of the mind had not produced the 
necessary incapacity . 
6. Mens rea was established for the assault charge , but 
not for the unlawful entry charge. Due to the "menta l 
abnormality" there was no intention for the encounter to 
be an unlawful one. Therefore, on this charge the accused 
received a complete acquittal. 
It is submitted that before this framework can be accepted as the 
basis for determining sane and insane automatism issues, there are 
four issues which must be analysed. 
5 These authorities are reviewed in the case see above nl , 242 including R v Hennessy (1989) 1 WLR 
287; (1989) 2 All ER 9 (CA); R v Quick (1973) QB 910; (1973] 3 All ER 347 (CA); R v Rabey (19 78) 
79 DLR (3d) 414. 
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The first three issues involve aspects of His Honour's focus on 
capacity. Fisher J saw capacity as the focal concept in section 23 
in determining whether the accused understands the nature and 
quality of the act or omission , or of knowing that the act or 
omission was morally wrong. Issue one, therefore , addresses 
whether this focus on capacity is correct. 
Fisher J supported his approach by submitting that the rea l 
question is always the capacity to form the mental elements of the 
crime (the "mens rea") . Therefore all the other tests used in 
previous cases are equivalent to asking whether the accused is 
incapable of forming the mental elements . Issue two , therefo re, 
addresses whether this mens rea approach is correct. 
His Honour then proposed three tests to determine whether this 
capacity exists - these must be satisfied before there ,s 
incapability , and hence before sect ion 23 can be claimed . Issue 
three, therefore , addresses whether these three proposed tests are 
appropriate. 
Hence to determine if there is a defence under sect ion 23 the 
question to ask of the accused is whether they are incapab le of 
understanding the nature and quality of the act or om ission (under 
limb a) . Th is is proven if the accused is incapable of form ing the 
mental elements, wh ich is determ ined by sat isfact ion of the three 
awareness tests. 
Once it is determined section 23 has not been satisfied there is a 
further question to ask, namely whether the accused did in fact 
have the mens rea, before a conviction is justified . Here arises the 
fourth issue. Is Fisher J correct in submitting that in determining 
this mens rea question , the evidence of mental abnorma li ty may be 
taken into account with all the other circumstances? If th is is 
correct , then it is poss ible to receive a complete acq uittal , 
notwithstanding the evidence of a mental abnormal ity . 
q 
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The discussion of Fisher J on capacity is based on three factual 
findings. 6 These are (i) That without the medical evidence of the 
mental abnormality there would have been sufficient proof to 
warrant an inference of mens rea (step 2). (ii) That there existed 
independently verified evidence of a mental abnormality which put 
doubt on the accused's capacity to form the required mental 
elements (step 3). (iii) That the medical evidence in the case 
amounted to a disease of the mind. Hence an insanity defence was 
raised and the onus of proving the incapacity rested on the accused 
(step 4). 
His Honour concluded on the facts of the case that the accused 
could not establish on the balance of probabilities that he was 
"incapable" of understanding the nature and quality of the act (step 
5). Hence there was no defence of insanity available. 7 
To determine whether this conclusion was correct it is necessary 
to analyse the three issues identified in relation to the focus on 
actual capacity. 
A The Focus On Capacity 
The original formulation of the insanity defence comes from the 
English House of Lords, who laid down the McNaghten rules: 8 
Labouring under such a defect of reason, from a disease of the mind, 
as not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing or if he 
did know it that he did not know what he was doing was wrong. 
The equivalent section in New Zealand is that in section 23 Crimes 
Act 1961, which has modified these rules . Section 23(2) provides 
that: 
6 Above nl, 246-249. 
7 Above nl, 255. 
8 Daniel McNaghtens Case (1843) 10 Cl & Fin 200; 8 ER 718. 
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No person shall be convicted of an offence by reason of an act done or 
omitted by him when labouring under natural imbecility or disease of 
the mind to such an extend as to render him incapable -
{a) of understanding the nature and quality of the act or omission: or 
{b) of knowing that the act or omission was morally wrong, having 
regard to the commonly accepted standards of right and wrong. 
It can be seen that New Zealand's legislation has introduced an 
additional criteria, in that the disease of the mind must render the 
accused incapable of understanding the nature and quality of the 
act as opposed to not knowing the nature and quality of the act, as 
under the McNaghten rules. 
Fisher J noted this distinction and emphasised that "incapable" is 
now an integral part of the section and submitted that it has 
become the focal concept. Is this correct? This can be resolved by 
considering the case law, the statutory context, policy arguments 
and authority from other jurisdictions. 
In R v MacMillan 9 the New Zealand Court of Appeal when 
discussing section 23(2)(b), said the question is whether the 
accused did understand that the act was morally wrong and that to 
focus on incapability was wrong. The principle is still the same 
for section 23(2)(a) because incapability applies to both . 
Turner J in MacMillan stated: 10 
We do not think any difference in meaning was intended, and that as 
this court accepted in Murdoch v British Israel World Federation 
(NZ) lncl 1 it was not intended that by using "incapable" in section 
43 of the 1908 Act 12 to alter in any way the test proposed in 
McNaghten ·s case, viz, that by reason of a defect of reason arising 
9 (1966] NZLR 616 (CA). 
lO Above n9 , 621. 
11 (1942] NZLR 600; (1942] GLR 390. 
12 This is now equivalent to section 23 in the 1961 Act. 
8 
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from disease of the mind the accused did not know that he was doing 
what was wrong. 
In its statutory context, the word incapable is clear, it cannot just 
be ignored. It is submitted that MacMillan is incorrect in saying 
that Parliament did not intend to alter the test. If Parliament did 
not intend this why did they change the wording from the 
McNaghten formulation of knowing the nature and quality of the act 
or omission, to section 23's formulation of incapable of 
understanding? The approach of Fisher J is in direct conflict with 
MacMillan. However it will be shown that Fisher J is supported by 
policy considerations and authority from other jurisdictions and it 
is submitted that R v MacMillan needs to be reconsidered. 
There are policy arguments to support the capability focus . It can 
be argued that the real inquiry is properly on capacity because the 
I..QJJl of insanity is to deal with the lack of capacity. If the accused 
is capable, the inquiry should just be the normal one "Did they or 
didn't they form the mens rea?" The role of the insanity defence is 
to make special provisions to assist those who are incapable of 
understanding or knowing, and hence who are not responsible , to 
the same extent as a sane person, for their act or omission. The 
defence also helps protect society from these people. 
Another supporting policy consideration is that it is appropriate to 
use expert evidence to show that the accused was incapable of 
understanding due to a disease of the mind, as opposed to did the 
accused actually understand. 
the factual issue in question 
the jury to determine. 
The expert cannot give testimony on 
("Did they understand?") as this is for 
There is supporting authority to be found in other jurisdictions. 
New Zealand's section 23 is similar to the equivalent Canad ian 
provision, which is section 16 of the Criminal Code. Section16(2) 
provides that: 
For the purposes of this section a person is insane when he is in a 
state of natural imbecility or has disease of the mind to an extent that 
9 
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renders him incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of an act 
or omission or of knowing that act or omission is wrong. 
10 
As can be seen the wording of the Canadian provision is nearly 
identical to New Zealand's, except that you must be incapable of 
appreciating as opposed to incapable of understanding the nature 
and quality of the act. 
In Canada, a report was issued by the Royal Commission on the Law 
of Insanity as a Defence in Criminal Cases. This was commonly 
known as the McRuer Report. In this report it was submitted that 1 3 
[M]ere knowledge of the nature and quality of the act ("Did the person 
know what he was doing") is not the true test to be applied. The true 
test necessary is, was the accused person at the very time of the 
offence - not before or after but at the moment of the offence - by 
reason of disease of the mind unable fully to appreciate, not only the 
nature of the act but the natural consequences that would flow from 
it? In other words was the accused person, by reason of disease of the 
mind, deprived of the mental capacity to foresee and measure the 
consequences of the act? 
This statement has been relied on by the Supreme Court of Canada 
in Cooper v The Queen 14 . Cooper held that the literal adoption of 
capacity is the correct focus. The code postulates a test which 
goes further than the "mere knowledge" required under the Engl ish 
approach. What is required is a capacity to apprehend the nature of 
the act and its consequences. 15 The Court found, therefore, that the 
focus is on whether the disease of the mind renders the accused 
13 Report of the Royal Commission on the Law of Insanity as a Defence in Criminal Cases (1956), sec 
p 13. 
14 (1980) 51 CCC (2d) 129 (SCC). 
15 Above nl4, 146. Dickson J stated that the position is well expressed in the McRuer Report at p 12: 
Under the Canadian Statute law a disease of the mind that renders the accused person 
incapable of an appreciation of the nature and quality of the act must necessarily 
involve more than mere knowledge that the act is being committed, there must be an 
appreciation of the factors involved in the act and a mental capacity to measure and 
foresee the consequences of the violent conduct 
• • ,. 
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incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of the act or 
omission. The test is not that of the English courts 16 that the 
disease of the mind means you do not know the nature and quality. 
The insertion of the word "incapable" was viewed as making a 
material difference. 
The facts of Cooper were that the appellant who was an out-
patient of a psychiatric hospital was attending a social function at 
the hospital, where he met the deceased, an in-patient. They left 
the group and went for a walk. The appellant asked the deceased to 
remove her clothing, which she did, and he then attempted to have 
sexual intercourse with her. He then grabbed her around the throat 
and choked her to death . The appellant gave differing stories to his 
Father and to the Police and finally admitted to causing her death. 
The appellant had had a long history of psychiatric treatment. 
The case held that the accused may have lacked the capacity to 
appreciate, in nature and quality, that death might result from the 
act although the accused may have been aware of the physical 
character of the action of choking her. 17 The appeal was allowed 
and a new trial was ordered. Several later cases have applied and 
followed Cooper. 18 
The approach taken by the Canadian court shows Fisher J 1s not 
alone in his focus on capacity to determine section 23 . Other 
jurisdictions have also dealt with this question. 
The American Model Penal Code, formulated by the American Law 
Institute, has been adopted by several American jurisdictions. It 
required the actor to lack the substantial capacity to appreciate 
16 The English courts still use the McNaghten rule and the cases illustrate this , such as R v Hennes.1e) 
[1989) 2 All ER 9. 
17 Above nl4, 145-146. 
18 These include R v Hem (1989) 72 CR (3d) 233, R v Chavest (1990) 76 CR (3d) 63, R v Barnier 
(1980) 51 CCC (2d) 193 (SCC) (a decision handed down on the same day as Cooper). 
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the criminality of their conduct.1 9 The cases have emphasised that 
the inquiry must be directed to the accused's capacity.20 
There has been criticism of this definition in that substantial 
incapacity should not be the test. The criticism was concerned 
with the situation when the accused can make out substantial 
incapacity and therefore is entitled to the defence, even though 
they actually did realise what they were doing. However it is 
submitted this is a theoretical limitation and situations like this 
would be very rare. Also in New Zealand the test is not substantial 
incapacity but rather a total incapacity. so this situation would not 
arise. 
The Australian codes also include the word capacity. The test is 
the accused's capacity to understand what he/she is doing (the 
Queensland and Western Australia Codes) or incapable of 
understanding the physical character (the Tasmanian Code) .21 
The Australian cases have interpreted these statutes as having 
capacity as the focal concept. Even though the English courts have 
taken the McNaghten rules as tantamount to a codification of the 
meaning of insanity, Australia and New Zealand have not. 22 
Stapleton v R 23 is authority for saying it is permissible to depart 
from the English courts pronouncements on insanity . The 
Australian cases say there must be a total deprivation of one of the 
specified capacities. Authority for this comes from R v Rolp h 2 1 
and R V O'Neill 25. 
The New Zealand statute has two such capacities - the capac ity to 
know the nature and quality of the act, or that it was mo rall y 
!9 Model Penal Code S 4.01. 
20 See Freeman v People 4 Denio (NY) 9, Duthey v State 131 Wis 178, 111 NW 222. 
21 See B Fisse Howard's Criminal Law (5ed, Law Book Co Ltd, Sydney, 1990) 455. 
22 See IC Campbell Mental Disorder and Criminal Law in Australia and New "Zealand (Butterworths, 
Sydney and Wellington, 1988) 121. 
23 (1952) 86 CLR 358, 368. 
24 [1962] Qd R 262, 272. 
25 [1976] Tas S R 66, 98. 
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wrong (a cognitive capacity). Under the Queensland, Western 
Australia and Northern Territories Codes, there is the cognitive 
capacity plus a volitional capacity of a capacity to control your 
action/resist an impulse. R v Falconer 26 shows that the focus is 
still on the capacity. "Unless it can be shown that the actor, being 
of sound mind, has been deprived of the capacity to control his 
actions ... " (emphasis added). 
The Australian commentators would appear to support this focus on 
capacity. Fisse in his book Ho ward's Criminal Law submits that the 
importance of a disease of the mind is that it might interfere with 
the accused's capacity to reason, not with his capacity to control 
himself or with his capacity to experience emotional sensitivity . 
Once again the focus is on the capacity.27 
Adams on Criminal Law 28 submits that the focus on "incapability" 
departs from the formula of the McNaghten rules which treat 
liability as depending on the existence or non existence of the 
relevant knowledge, not on the capacity to know. MacMillan is 
cited in support and it is argued that it is unthinkable that a jury 
should be told to distinguish between proved absence of knowledge , 
and a theoretical capacity to know . Therefore it is questionab le 
whether section 23 (2)(a) requires true incapacity. 2 9 
The jury should be focusing on this "theoretical" capacity because 
the insanity defence is for those who are incapable and hence who 
need help. Absence of knowledge may be for a variety of reasons . 
but it is only when there is absence due to an incapacity to 
know/understand that the defence should be available . 
It is submitted that this focus on capacity is correct and support ,s 
found in contextual arguments, policy and from other jurisdictions. 
But this focal word seems to have been ignored in a lot of insanity 
26 (1990) 65 ALJR 20. 
27 Above n21, 454. 
28 Hon J B Robertson Adams on Criminal Law (Brooker & Friend Ltd, Wellington, I 992) Volume I . 
29 MacMillan has alredady been discussed above, and it was submiued that on policy grounds the eh.mg~ 
in the New Zealand statute means the focus is now on capacity. 
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cases. This is shown by Burnskey v Police 30 a case heard shortly 
after Bannin. The issue involved determining the dividing line 
between insanity and automatism cases, but Bannin was not 
discussed. Therefore the approach is still not clear and it has been 
submitted that the rationale still needs to be resolved.31 
8 THE ISSUE OF CAPACITY TO FORM THE MENS REA 
Section 23(2)(a) states that the accused must be rendered 
incapable of understanding the "nature and quality" of the act or 
omission. Here Fisher J makes a distinction between the two 
concepts of "nature" and "quality". His Honour understands "nature" 
to refer to the actual act - this refers to a situation when the 
accused is unconscious so there will be a total lack of capacity to 
understand the act or omission (this will be a rare situation) . 
Hence "unconscious involuntary action" suffices as a test. 32 
It is accepted by both the medical and legal professions that there 
are many different levels of consciousness, it is "a matter of 
degree not kind". 33 Fisher J concluded this is why the cases are not 
easily reconciled. In some cases, mere impairment of conscious 
understanding and reasoning power have not been enough.34 But in 
other cases the defence has been given notwithstanding at least a 
residual degree of awareness. 35 These cases reflect the view that 
there is no stated level of capacity to compare the accused 's 
behaviour to. The distinction made by Fisher J between "fu ll 
3o Unreported, 1 May 1992, High Court Wellington Registry, AP 102/91). 
31 E Macdonald "Acquittal for the Intoxiacted Automaton" (1993) NZU 44. 
32 Bratty v Allorney General for Northern Ireland [1963) AC 386; [1961) 3 All ER 523 (HL). 
33 This is discussed by M 'Caldon "Automatism" (1964) 91 Can Med Ass J 91 I. 
34 In Broome v Perkins (1987) 85 Cr App R 321 the accused was on a charge of driving without due care 
and attention. He was in a hypoglycaemia state but this was not enough because he still had sufficient 
conscious control over his car to be able to brake violently and veer away from other vehicles. Other 
cases which support this are R v !sill (1978) RTR 211 and Haynes v MOT (1988) 3 CRNZ 587. 
35 In R v K [1971) 2 OR 401 the accused had killed his wife while in shock when informed she wa5 
leaving him, he was said to have been in a state of diminished awareness. Another case which supporL\ 
this is R v T [1990) Crim LR 256. 
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consciousness" and "partial consciousness" is helpful as it shows 
that different levels of awareness apply in different situations. 
His Honour concluded that "quality" was best reserved for when the 
accused has some degree of consciousness or awareness (this will 
be the case in the majority of situations). Where the accused is 
unconscious the focus is on the "nature" of the act (the actus reus) , 
but where there is some consciousness the focus is on the 
"quality", the actus reus focus is of no assistance (because partial 
consciousness will ensure there is voluntariness), so the proper 
focus is on the mens rea. If the accused lacks the capacity to form 
any one of the mental elements to the crime, the prosecution must 
fail. One way of demonstrating the absence of a mental element is 
to show that due to a mental abnormality, at the material time , the 
accused was incapable of satisfying it. 
His Honour further supports this distinction by saying there is no 
legislative intent to distinguish between the actus reus and the 
mens rea. The expansive interpretation comes from the fact that 
lack of capacity to form the necessary mens rea could fall within 
section 23 on the basis that there was no capacity to understand 
the "quality" of the act . Otherwise the dist inction wou ld be 
between when the accused lacked capacity to understand the 
immediate physical nature .arui where capacity is lim ited to the 
formation of the mens rea . Both have a dangerous incapacity 
caused by a disease of the mind.36 
The conclusion of Fisher J was that "capable of understand ing the 
nature and quality of the act" is either the physical nature and 
quality (totally unconscious, so focus on the actus reus) or mens 
rea (reduced unconsciousness , therefore it is necessary to focus on 
the mens rea) . The two questions which arise from th is approach 
are: (i) Was His Honour correct in saying that where there is some 
degree of consciousness the focus should be on the capac ity to 
form the mens rea? (ii) Is section 23 cons istent with th is in th at 
lack of capacity to form the mens rea could come with in the 
"quality" of the act. 
36 For the discussion of Fisher J on all of th is see above n l , 250-51 . 
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(i) The traditional approach has been to ask whether there was 
action without conscious volition, and to focus on the absence of 
voluntariness. For example Haynes v MOT 37 talks of being capable 
of voluntary conscious action. The idea is that if voluntariness is 
not established no crime has been committed and the question of 
mens rea is irrelevant. But Fisher J has added that as well as 
insanity being able to negate the requirement for voluntary conduct 
it can also negate the mens rea. 
Fisher J concluded that there is no need to distinguish between the 
actus reus and the mens rea, as the true foundation lies in the 
mental elements. Brookbanks38 has argued that this comes close to 
stating that automatism is only available for cases where intent is 
a requirement. MOT v Strong 39 is an authority for this proposition . 
But there is a logical difficulty if absence of voluntariness could 
defeat liability on an absolute liability charge but automatism per 
se could not. 
It is submitted that the reason Fisher J did not need to distinguish 
between the actus reus and the mens rea is because on the facts 
this was a partially conscious action, in which focusing on the 
actus reus would have been of no assistance - hence the reason why 
it was stated that the focus must be on the mental elements . 
The Canadian courts seem to support Fisher J and have held in R v 
Abbey 40 
The ability to appreciate the nature and quality of one 's act includes 
the ability to perceive the physical consequences and impact of the 
act. It refers to the physical character of the act , and requ ires 
sufficient mental capacity to measure and foresee the consequences of 
conduct. A delusion which renders an accused incapable of 
appreciating the nature and quality of his act goes to the mens rea of 
37 [1988) 3 CRNZ 587. 
38 See Brookbanks above n2. 
39 [1987] 2 NZLR 295. 
4o [1982) 29 CR (3d) 193, 194 (SCC). 
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the offence, and results in a verdict of not guilty by reason of 
insanity. 
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The accused then, must have sufficient mental capacity to measure 
and foresee the consequences. The approach of Fisher J hinges on 
saying that when the accused has some level of unconsciousness, 
focusing on the actus reus is of no assistance, so it is necessary to 
look to the mens rea (which is also an essential element). 
It is submitted that when there is "partial consciousness" there 
will always be some awareness of the physical act itself, for 
example that you are hitting someone, so it will be necessary to 
consider whether they ~ incapable of understanding the 
"intention/recklessness" or as the Canadians have stated - if they 
can measure and foresee the consequences, because then the 
accused must have the capability of having intention.41 
Cooper 42 is authority for saying that the requirement of being able 
to perceive the consequences of a physical act is a restatement of 
the principle of mens rea. The mental elements must be proved 
with respect to all the circumstances and consequences that form 
part of the actus reus. This gives authority for the proposition put 
forward by Fisher J, of focusing on the mens rea, if one perceives 
the consequences, they must have been capable of having the 
intention. 
(ii) It is submitted that Fisher J is also correct in stating that the 
focus on the mens rea comes from the reference to the "quality" of 
the act. Authority for this comes from R v K 43 , where it was held 
that nature and quality refers to physical nature and consequences 
of the act. This is supported by Halsburys.44 
41 Abbey staled at p 204 that "A delusion which renders an accused incapable of appreciating the nature 
and quality of the act goes to the mens rea" , so surely if you are incapable of understanding the mens rca 
there is no capability. 
42 Above nl4, 147. 
43 [1971) 2 OR 401. 
44 Halsbury' s Laws of England (4ed, Butterworlhs, London, 1980) vol 11 (1 ) para 31 , p 36. This say~ 
the authority for this comes from R v Codere {1916) 12 Cr App Rep 2 1 CCA. 
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The reference to consequences shows that if you can foresee the 
consequences you must have had the intention, therefore the word 
"quality" supports the focus on the mens rea.45 It is submitted 
that Fisher J is correct in focusing on the mens rea in these 
situations. Any impairment of the mens rea or the actus reus 
should activate the insanity defence. 
C Proposed Tests For Determining Capacity 
Fisher J translates this partial level of awareness where the focus 
is on the mens rea (as discussed above), into an inquiry of capac ity 
determined by the three awareness tests identified. Once these are 
satisfied the accused is aware and hence has the capacity to 
understand the quality of their act. On the other hand if these are 
not satisfied the accused lacks capacity and therefore must rely on 
an insanity defence. 
The first of these three tests (called the "deliberative funct ions of 
the mind") was some appreciation of each of the key facts re levant 
to the crime. On the facts of Bannin for the unlawful entry charg e 
these key facts were being able to recognise the existence of the 
house next door which did not belong to him , that he was wa lking 
toward it, that it contained a woman , and that he was entering . But 
Fisher J does note that the mental capacity for a more comp lex 
crime would be much more difficult.46 
The second requirement was some capacity to make a dec ision to 
act with respect to the key facts. This contemplates a capac ity to 
exercise several decision making functions including advance 
appreciation of the possibility of acting in this way ; a 
contemplation of innocent alternatives ; then convert ing the 
contemplated action into a mental commitment and finally issuing 
the appropriate commands . On the facts of Bannin the accused 
45 Also the distinction given makes sense. If there is an impairment of the mens rea or the actus reus, 
then a question of insanity must arise. 
46 The example cited is uttering a forged document - where there would be more complicated mental 
elements such as knowing you were forging a signature, recognising you were forging on a document. 
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would have had to have been able to stay away from the 
complainant if he had considered this (an innocent alternative) and 
must have commanded his body to enter the house (an appropriate 
command). This test was therefore satisfied. 
The third requirement was some capacity to form each of the 
residual mental elements of the mens rea involved. In Bannin with 
the unlawful entry charge the accused would also need the capacity 
to form the ulterior intent (at the time of entry) of locating and 
assaulting the complainant.47 
Although Fisher J qualified this. 48 The key question being whether 
before and after the event the accused was aware of the critical 
facts and whether, having that knowledge the accused then acted in 
a certain way . Once this is satisfied it would be difficult to argue 
the accused did not have the necessary level of capacity, barring 
any contrary evidence. The situation where awareness is present , 
but there is incapability of making a voluntary decision to act, was 
left open for future cases. 
The limited nature of these awareness/capacity requirements was 
recognised by Fisher J as he stated "however clouded, confused and 
distant" your awareness is , you still have awareness. 49 The 
accused only needs capacity to exercise these three funct ion in 
some degree, there is no particular standard to achieve . It is no 
defence if your capacity is severely impaired or it was a 
compulsive urge. The question is whether the capacity was there 
at all. 
On the facts of Bannin the tests were satisfied. The accused was 
in a state of partial dissociation, but the accused remembe red 
going to the house and grabbing the complainant , so he was aware 
of the key facts (test 1 ). The actions taken were simple ones - and 
47 Above nl, 250-252. 
48 Fisher J at p 252 concluded that it was doubtful whether criteria two adds much to criteria one. "It 1s 
one thing to have a capacity another to exercise it. " This means the accused does not have to actively 
consider all the innocent alternatives and deliberately reject them. 
49 Above n l , 253. 
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it was not shown that he lacked the necessary decision-making 
capacity (test 2). And the onus was not discharged to show that he 
did not have the capacity to simultaneously contemplate in advance 
the immediate act of entering and the deferred acts of finding and 
touching the complainant - this conclusion could not be drawn from 
the state of dissociation (test 3). Therefore the accused in Ba nnin 
had a reduced level of consciousness and awareness, but this did 
not negate the capacity to form the mental elements. Therefore 
the section 23 defence was not made out - the accused had the 
capacity so there was no defence. 
Are these tests for capacity appropriate? Haynes v MOT 50 is an 
illustration of how the capcity question was decided before Bannin . 
In this case Haynes was convicted of refusing to allow a blood 
specimen to be taken when requested to do so by a registered 
medical practitioner. The accused was involved in a motor 
collision, which as a result he sustained injuries and was taken to 
hospital. During the course of events he refused to give a blood 
specimen which would have determined if he had consumed alcoho l. 
The evidence showed that there was a probability that the brain 
was not functioning normally, so the refusal to give a blood test 
was not a fully conscious voluntary action. But Gault J said full 
consciousness was too high a standard for the mental element, in 
which to compare the capacity of a person .51 It was sufficient if 
the accused would have been capable of voluntary conscious action , 
even though the mental processes, to a degree, might have been 
depleted. The test is one of voluntariness . 
Fisher J went much further and concluded that it was only 
necessary to have capacity to exercise these three functions in 
some degree - then there is automatic awareness, and therefore 
there is capacity. 
The proposed test is very strict. If the accused has any 
recollection later (even partial recollection) then they must have 
50 Above n37 . 
51 Above n37, 591. 
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had prior awareness.52 This is because the accused can only have 
later recollection of what they were previously aware of. As 
stated above on the actual facts of Bannin the accused was 1n a 
state of partial dissociation and because he remembered going to 
the house he had sufficient awareness. So, memory became the 
decisive factor. 
For an accused to establish incapacity, and hence an insanity 
defence, the best option is criteria three - some capacity to form 
each of the residual mental elements, such as an intention to 
locate and assault the complainant once he entered the house. The 
residual elements are a more complex step in the line of intention 
and actions. However, considering the type of offences likely to be 
committed by a person in this state, the residual elements will not 
be that complicated. 53 Criteria two and three which involve some 
appreciation of the key facts and some capacity to make a desision 
to act, will usually be easily satisfied by someone who has partial 
consciousnes. A partially conscious person will struggle to prove 
they did not have capacity in some degree, and hence will not be 
able to establish insanity. 
The policy behind the test is correct - if the accused is not aware 
and therefore has no capacity, then these are the people who should 
be pleading insanity. But it is submitted that it will only be for 
very complicated crimes with residual mental elements and hard to 
comprehend 'essential facts, in which incapacity could be 
established and it is not likely someone in this state of partial 
consciousness will commit these more complicated crimes . It 1s 
submitted that the focus is a valid one, but the tests will make it 
very difficult to succeed in an action of this kind. 
52 So an obvious test is of memory - because it is difficult to see how there could be recollec tion later 
without prior awareness to the standard required. See above n 1, 253 . 
53 These types of offences will be the less complex ones which will have less complicated mental 
elements and lack of residual mental elements, plus simple and readily comprehended facts (eg) assault as 
opposed to uttering a forged document. 
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The Canadian courts have decided in R v Simpson 54 th at 
appreciation of the nature and quality of the act does not import a 
requirement that the act be accompanied by appropriate fee li ngs 
about the effect of the act on other people . Kjeldsen v R goes on 
to state that5 5 
To be capable of appreciating the nature and quality of his acts an 
accused person must have the capacity to know what he is doing, in the 
case at bar, for example, to know that he was hitting the woman on the 
head with the rock, with great force, and in addition he must have the 
capacity to estimate and to understand the physical consequences 
which would flow from his act , in this case that he was caus ing 
physical injury which would result in death. 
The test for capacity (awareness) given in this case was capac ity 
to know what he/she is doing . This is similar to an apprec iation of 
the key facts (test 1) and a capacity to make a decision to act with 
respect to those facts (test 2). It is submitted that the Canad ian 
test is much more general and it would be easier to prove an 
incapacity, compared to the Bannin tests which breaks down each 
part of the action and makes it harder to find an overall incapacity . 
This can be illustrated by the Bannin facts. On the evidence such 
. as the dissociation and the trance like state , it would be easi er to 
show that there was incapac ity to understand what he was do ing . 
As shown in the decision once it is broken down into recog nising 
the house next door , recogn ising the fact that he was wa lking 
toward it, and the fact that it contained a woman ... , it makes 1t 
more likely that the accused had the capac ity for each ind iviual 
action , and hence an overall capacity . 
The second Canadian test is a capacity to estimate and understand 
the phys ical consequences wh ich would flow from the act. If the 
accused understands the phys ical consequences they must have 
54 (1977) 35 CCC (2d) 337 (Ont CA). 
55 (198 1) 24 CR (3d) 289,295 (SCC). The facts in th is case were that the accused had engaged a female 
taxi driver, raped her at kni fe poin t, and brutal ly ki lled her by del ivering several blows with a large rock Lo 
her head. 
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some mens rea. It is submitted that this test makes it easier to 
show an incapacity. In Bannin Fisher J concluded that the accused 
could not satisfy test three (the accused did not show that he did 
not have the capacity to simultaneously contemplate in advance the 
immediate act of entering and the deferred act of finding and 
touching the complainant). However if the facts are tested against 
"a capacity to estimate and understand the physical consequences " 
(the Canadian test) it is more likely that it would be found that no 
capacity exists because the accused would have had to contemplate 
the entry and his actions once inside, plus understand the 
consequences of the action. 
Therefore the Canadian tests are more approariate, due to their 
generality, as it does not make it so impossible to prove 
incapacity. In Bannin because very specific tests were given , it 
was much easier to find some degree of awareness, and hence no 
incapacity. It is submitted that the focus of Fisher J was correct , 
but that the tests proposed were far too strict . This would result 
in the insanity defence being largely unavailable, and , if this 
evidence of the mental abnormality is allowed into determining the 
next question (step 6) the mens rea question (as discussed below), 
then the result would be more acquittals. 
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111 USING THE DISEASE OF THE MIND 
EVIDENCE WHEN DETERMINING MENS REA 
Fisher J decided that once it is decided that the accused does have 
capacity (and therefore there can be no reliance on the defence of 
insanity) the next relevant question is "Did he/she have the mens 
rea?" More importantly His Honour concluded that when 
determining this question it is permissible to take into account the 
mental abnormality with all the other circumstances. If the 
accused did have the mens rea (and does not satisfy limb section 
23 (2)(b)) , then it will be inferred that the accused is guilty . If 
mens rea is absent a complete acquittal is given, even though the 
lack of mens rea stems from a disease of the mind. 
In Bannin the accused was acquitted on the unlawful entry charge 
because the evidence (especially the medical evidence) raised a 
reasonable doubt as to whether the intent had in fact been formed 
at the time of entry. The accused had a disease of the mind , but 
was capable of having the mens rea (on the tests) so insanity was 
not proven. However, the accused did not actually have the mens 
rea on the facts , so there was a complete acquittal! 
Is this a valid approach? Can the mental abnormality be taken into 
account when determining the mens rea question? Adams on 
Criminal Law 56 states that this approach is wrong - it should not 
be taken into account. When evidence of insanity fails to establish 
the defence of insanity it seems wrong that it can then be used to 
support an unqualified acquittal on the grounds of lack of mens rea. 
Adams concludes that the mens rea issue should be decided without 
reference to any evidence of insanity and before that defence is 
considered . The authority cited for this is R v S . 57 
The facts of this case were that the accused who was a German , 
had been living in Australia. On the day in question two women in 
units next door to where he was living saw the accused in his 
56 Above n28, CA 23.36. 
57 (1979] 2 SWLR 1. 
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backyard firing a rifle , shooting at the shed and at bottles . The 
police were called, upon which the accused stayed inside fir ing the 
rifle, even after being asked in German to throw out his rifle and 
come out with his hands up. This went on for a number of hours and 
ended when the accused finally came out. He was charged with 
discharging a loaded firearm with the intent to prevent his lawfu l 
apprehension. 
There was medical evidence showing he was a schizophrenic, and 
that he was suffering from hallucinations, delusions and a thought 
disorder. This case held it was wrong to give a complete acqu itta l 
by using the illness as precluding the accused from forming the 
intent (the mens rea). This is an effort to avoid proof of insanity 
by the accused and instead to impose on the Crown proof of sanity 
as an element in the proof of guilt. 
This is further supported by Glanville Williams.58 He states that59 
The rule is that where mens rea is denied, the jury if it accepts the 
denial, must consider whether there was insanity. If mens rea was 
absent on account of insanity, or if in any event there was insanity 
and the case falls within the McNaghten rules the proper verdict is 
"guilty of the act but insane". If mens rea was absent on account of 
sane ignorance or mistake, the proper verdict is an acquitta1.60 
For practical purposes if the evidence of mental instability can be 
adduced for proving incapacity (on the balance of probab ilit ies) so 
as to have a qualified acquittal , and to prove there was no mens rea 
(by raising a reasonable doubt) so as to get a complete acqu ittal, 
then the accused will always adduce it for the second purpose . 
Th is is because there wou ld be a complete acqu itta l, and the 
58 G lanvil le W ill iams Criminal Law the General Part (2ed, SLevens & Sons Ltd, London, I 96 I)) 522. 
59 Above n58, 522. 
60 R v Youssef [ 1990) 50 A Crim R 1 says Lhat if Lhe evidence fa lls short of establishing Lhe accused chd 
noL know whal he was doing (Lhe insanity defence), and lhe same evidence may creale a reasonable doubt 
that he did know whal he was doing (an acquiual) this would give a very odd resull, and needs urgent 
reform. 
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accused would only have to raise a reasonable doubt as opposed to 
proving on the balance of probabilities. 
Hence, this would render the defence of insanity useless . The 
concern here is with those who need help and who are a danger to 
society - giving them a complete acquittal will not help them or 
society. 
It could be argued that what Fisher J was trying to do here was in 
relation to the standard of proof not the onus of proof - it is often 
the Prosecution who will want to raise it. They will have to prove 
beyond reasonable doubt as opposed to the balance of probabilities. 
The Canadian courts are leaning towards a "compromise" as 
St u a rt 61 puts it, where evidence ( usually psychiatric) will be 
admitted to negative proof of mens rea, with the resulting 
conviction only for a reduced charge. For example a charge of 
manslaughter as opposed to murder. An example is R v More . 6 2 
The facts of this case were that the accused shot his wife through 
the head while she was asleep. He then wrote a number of letters 
explaining why he had done it. He concealed this crime during the 
day and during the afternoon he attempted suicide by shooting 
himself through the head. He did not die and phoned the police to 
tell them what he had done. The majority held that the psych iatric 
evidence of an impaired mental ability stemming from depress ive 
psychosis had a "direct be'aring" on whether the killing was 
deliberate. 
Fauteux J dissented, complaining that admitting this evidence 
short of establishing insanity would be "tantamount to introducing 
in the Canadian law a new and secondary test of legal 
i rrespo ns ibi I ity. "63 It would be a concept of mental respons ibility 
of a lesser degree for which no legal standard is given . 64 
61 D Stuart Canadian Criminal Law: A Treatise (2ed, The Carswell Co Ltd, Toronto, 1987) 337-342. 
62 (1963) SCR 522. 
63 Above n62, 529. 
64 There is no defence of diminished responsibility in Canada. 
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This has been applied to other capital murder cases65 and later on 
to charges of murder not in the capital (first degree) murder 
category . However R v Wright 66 held that the evidence of mental 
disorder negating mens rea must be directly related to the 
accused's state of mind at the time in question. 
In Canada therefore, there is authority for allowing evidence of 
mental disorder to negate mens rea. It is a reflection of taking the 
mens rea inquiry seriously. 67 "The crucial problem is to determine 
what was in the accused's mind .. . need to look at his whole 
personality, including any mental disorder or disturbance from 
which he may be suffering ... apart from the defence of insanity".68 
But there are problems with this approach. Firstly this has only 
been applied to murder charges. Although in R v Macdonald 69 a 
case involving a robbery charge, there was psychiatric evidence 
which was admitted to show a mental disability (short of legal 
insanity), that would render the accused incapable of forming the 
requisite specific intent. The conviction was not overturned and 
the admissibility of the psychiatric evidence was not questioned . 
However, it is submitted that there would be problems in expanding 
this "compromise" situation , in that not every offence has a 
reduced charge. 
Secondly, given that the tests laid down by Fisher J make it very 
difficult to prove incapacity, it would mean' that the evidence 
would constantly be used as going toward the mens rea, and hence 
result in a lot more reduced charges. (Although this is preferred to 
people getting complete acquittals). The original policy behind this 
reduced charge was to avoid the death sentence, and it has been 
65 This developments is explained as reflecting I.he concern of I.he courts to avoid the death enLcnce or 1ts 
replacemenl of life imprisonment, with a minimum Lerrn of 25 years in prison before eligible for parole. 
See Stuart above n61, 338. 
66 (1979) 48 CCC (2d) 334. 
67 GA Martin "Insanity as a Defence" (1966) 3 CLQ 240 expressed this view years ago. 
68 R v Barnier (1978) 37 CCC (2d) 508, 510 (BC CA) goes further and suggeslS thal I.he real quesuon 1s 
"should the accu ed be confined in a mental institution" as opposed to tesLS based on capacity. 
69 ( 1976) 29 CCC (2d) 257, 260. 
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said that the remarks in More 70 were not intended to apply to mens 
rea generally . 
Thirdly, due to the potential overlap with the defence of insanity 
this "escape route" involves uncertainity and semantics , wh ich 
highlights the need for comprehensive reform of the law of 
insanity. 71 
It is submitted that Fisher J is wrong in using evidence of menta l 
instability to determine mens rea once you have already rejected 
the defence of insanity. We have no diminished responsb ili ty 
defence in New Zealand, and as of yet no "compromise" situation . 
Therfore, it is up to the legislature to provide addit ional defences 
in this area. 
70 Above n62, 338. 
71 Above n31. 
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IV CONCLUSION 
The defence of insanity is very controversial and is difficult in 
application. There have been numerous approaches used and Bannin 
provides an . articulated framework to follow through, and it is 
submitted that it is a worthwhile approach to adopt. 
Firstly His Honour's focus on the word capacity is justified on 
context, po I icy arguments and on authority from other 
jurisdictions, especially Canada. It is not a new concept conjured 
up it is an acceptable focus, especially considering section 23 's 
departure from the original McNaghten formulation so as to include 
that the accused must be incapable of understanding as opposed to 
the accused not knowing. 
The focus on the mental elements is supported by reference to the 
word "quality" in section 23 . As Fisher J concluded, the actus reus 
is appropriate for total unconsciousness, but this will seldom be 
the case, and a focus on the mens rea seems correct for partial 
consciousness (the majority of cases). 
The tests proposed to determine capacity are very strict, and beg 
the question of who would be caught under these requirements . 
There is a need to weigh up and balance the compet ing 
considerations, including the necessity for strict tests, but also 
the need for an insanity test to be available for those who need it. 
However, some general guidelines are an improvement over the 
current situation which has resulted in various tests being applied . 
The Canadian tests are more general , easier to measure up to and 
hence afford a better approach. 
Finally, it is submitted that the use of the abnormality evidence to 
determine the mens rea question is wrong. It is not right that the 
accused should receive a complete acquittal even though there is 
some evidence of abnormality, but just not enough to establish 
incapacity. This conclusion is supported by other writers, as 
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discussed above. Alternative defences in th is area are up to th e 
legislature to investigate . 
In conclusion Police v Bannin is a very useful case as it finall y 
attempts to lay down some guidelines to aid Judges in determ ining 
these vital questions involved with the insan ity defence . This 1s 
necessary because after all we are talking about peoples lives and 
determining which is the best way to help them and society . 
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